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LEAD ARTICLE 
CITIZEN PETITIONS:                               
LONG, LATE-FILED, AND AT-LAST DENIED 
MICHAEL A. CARRIER AND CARL MINNITI* 
The pharmaceutical industry is ground zero for many of the most 
challenging issues at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law.  
It also presents a complex regulatory regime that is ripe for anticompetitive 
behavior.  It thus should not be a surprise that the industry has been subject to 
rigorous antitrust scrutiny in recent years. 
While settlements between brand and generic firms and “product hopping” 
from one version of a drug to another have received attention, one behavior 
has avoided serious scrutiny.  Brand firms’ filing of citizen petitions with the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has almost entirely slipped 
beneath the radar.  While citizen petitions in theory could raise concerns that a 
drug is unsafe, in practice they bear a dangerous potential to extend brand 
monopolies by delaying approval of generics at a potential cost of millions of 
dollars per day. 
This Article offers an empirical study of “505(q)” citizen petitions, which 
ask the FDA to take specific action against a pending generic application.  It 
analyzes every 505(q) petition filed with the FDA between 2011 and 2015, 
documenting (1) the number of petitions each year, (2) who filed the petitions, 
(3) the success rate of the petitions, (4) the petitions’ length, (5) whether 
petitions were filed in close proximity to the expiration of a patent or data 
exclusivity, and (6) occasions in which the FDA approved generics on the same 
day it decided petitions. 
                                                 
 * Distinguished Professor, Rutgers Law School; 3L, Rutgers Law School.  We 
would like to thank Kurt Karst and David Schwartz for very helpful comments.  
Copyright © 2016 Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti. 
CARRIER.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2016  3:28 PM 
306 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:305 
The study finds that brand firms filed 92% of 505(q) petitions. And it 
concludes that the FDA granted an astonishingly low 8% of petitions, 
rejecting a full 92%.  Why is the grant rate so low?  We consider several 
reasons.  First, in the past 5 years, the average length of petitions has more 
than doubled, and the FDA almost never grants petitions with a length above 
the mean.  Second, 39% of petitions are filed within 6 months of the 
expiration of a patent or FDA exclusivity, with almost all of these petitions 
denied.  Third, the FDA resolved a number of petitions on the same day it 
approved the generic, suggesting that the Agency delayed generic approval 
until it resolved the petition.  These three settings resulted in grants of only 
3%, 2%, and 0%, respectively. 
The Article concludes by offering examples of serial petitions, late-filed 
petitions, and a combination of petitions with other behavior, such as product 
hopping and settlements.  In short, citizen petitions represent a hidden tool in 
a brand firm’s toolkit of entry-delaying activity that can lead to consumers 
paying high drug prices while providing no offsetting safety benefit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry is ground zero for many of the most 
challenging issues at the intersection of antitrust and intellectual 
property law.  Patents play a crucial role in the costly and lengthy 
process of new drug development.  But the complexity of the 
regulatory regime and the dramatic effects on a brand firm’s profits 
when generics enter the market provide a setting rife with potentially 
anticompetitive behavior. 
It thus should not be a surprise that the industry has been subject 
to rigorous antitrust scrutiny in recent years.  Courts have examined 
“pay for delay” settlements by which brand-name drug companies pay 
generics to settle patent litigation and delay entering the market.1  
Courts also have scrutinized “product hopping,” by which a brand 
firm switches from one version of a drug to another, often for the 
sole purpose of delaying generic entry.2 
Amidst all this attention, one behavior has avoided serious scrutiny.  
Brand firms’ filing of citizen petitions with the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has almost entirely slipped beneath the radar.  
In theory, citizen petitions could raise concerns that a drug is unsafe. 
But in practice, they bear a dangerous potential to extend brand 
firms’ monopolies by delaying approval of generics at a potential cost 
of millions of dollars per day. 
Not all citizen petitions raise anticompetitive concern.  But one 
type is potentially troublesome:  the so-called “505(q)” petition.  
These are petitions that ask the FDA to take a particular action 
against a pending generic application.  In fact, Congress specifically 
addressed concerns about the abuse of these petitions when it passed 
the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
                                                 
 1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 2. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638 (2d 
Cir. 2015). 
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(FDAAA),3 requiring the FDA to resolve citizen petitions in an 
expedient manner to avoid generic delay.4 
This Article offers an empirical study of every 505(q) citizen 
petition filed with the FDA between 2011 and 2015.  It documents (1) 
the number of petitions filed each year, (2) who filed the petitions, 
(3) the success rate of the petitions, (4) the petitions’ length, (5) 
whether petitions were filed immediately before the expiration of a 
patent or data exclusivity, and (6) whether the FDA approved 
generics on the same day—or in the same month—it decided the 
citizen petition. 
The study finds that brand firms file 92% of 505(q) petitions—each 
attacking a proposed generic.  And remarkably, the FDA has granted 
only 8% of petitions, while denying 92%.  In other words—and based 
on the first empirical survey of citizen petitions we conducted several 
years ago5—the already low rate of 19% of petitions granted from 
2001 to 2010 fell by more than half in the succeeding 5 years.  In 
short, 505(q) citizen petitions are almost never granted. 
Why is the grant rate so low?  We explore several reasons.  First, in 
the past 5 years, the length of petitions has more than doubled.  The 
FDA grants only 3% of petitions with a page length longer than the 
mean, supporting the thesis that they are filed to hamstring the FDA 
and delay generic entry rather than raise legitimate safety concerns.  
Second, 39% of brand petitions were filed within six months of the 
expiration of a patent or FDA exclusivity.  Here as well, almost none 
of the petitions—2%—are granted.  And third, the FDA granted 
approval to 6 generics on the same day—and an additional 17 in the 
same month—it resolved a petition, denying every one of the 
petitions and raising the concern that the FDA is delaying generic 
approval until it dispenses with the citizen petition. 
This Article concludes by offering four case studies of concerning 
petitions.  COPAXONE presents an instance of serial petitions, with 
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (Teva) filing eight petitions to delay a 
generic version of the multiple-sclerosis drug.  Late-filed petitions 
also raise questions, such as when Bayer HealthCare filed a petition 
                                                 
 3. Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007). 
 4. See 153 CONG. REC. 25,047 (2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also CTR. FOR 
DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY:  CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF ACTION SUBJECT TO SECTION 
505(Q) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1 (1st rev. 2014) [hereinafter 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY]. 
 5. See Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions:  An Empirical Study, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 249 (2012). 
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one day before the expiration of the patent on MIRENA, a long-acting 
intrauterine device (IUD).  The combination of citizen petitions and 
other behavior, such as product hopping, raises concern, as shown by 
the example of acne-treating DORYX.  And Mylan’s anaphylaxis-
treating EpiPen reveals the combination of petitions and settlements. 
Part I of this Article introduces the Hatch-Waxman Act,6 enacted by 
Congress in 1984 to create a framework for brand and generic 
pharmaceutical competition.  Part I also discusses settlements 
between brand and generic firms as well as product hopping, paying 
particular attention to the importance of generic competition and 
timing of generic entry. 
Part II explains our methodology.  It offers our general approach, 
describing our process for tracking petitions and explaining how we 
narrowed our analysis to a particular category of petitions.  It also 
explains how we parsed “mixed” decisions to determine if the petitions 
were essentially granted or denied.  And it presents our methods of 
analyzing issues related to the complexity and timing of the petitions. 
Part III turns to citizen petitions, providing an introduction to the 
conduct and showing how they are filed most frequently in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  This Part focuses on 505(q) petitions, which 
ask the FDA to take specific action against a pending generic drug 
application and which arose out of legislation enacted in 2007 to 
prevent market entry delays resulting from the filing of 505(q) petitions. 
Part IV analyzes 505(q) petitions as well as their grant/denial rate 
both in general and for brand petitions in particular. 
Part V then explores reasons for 505(q) petitions’ low success rates. 
It traces the increasing complexity of petitions, the number of 
petitions filed within 6 months of the expiration of a patent or FDA 
exclusivity, and the number of petitions the FDA resolved on the 
same day—or in the same month—it approved a generic.  For each of 
these scenarios, Part V compares these specific grant/denial rates to 
the overall figures. 
Finally, Part VI offers examples of concerning behavior of brand 
firms in filing serial petitions, late-filed petitions, and the 
combination of citizen petitions with product hopping and 
settlements.  This Article concludes that citizen petitions represent a 
hidden tool in a brand firm’s toolkit of entry-delaying activity that can 
                                                 
 6. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012 & Supp. II 
2015)). 
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lead to consumers paying high drug prices while providing no 
offsetting safety benefit. 
I. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPETITION 
The regulatory regime and economics of the pharmaceutical 
industry explain why it is uniquely susceptible to behavior delaying 
competitors’ entry.  Monopoly profits fall dramatically when generics 
enter the market, and the Hatch-Waxman Act and state substitution 
laws have created opportunities that can be exploited to forestall entry.  
It is in this setting that citizen petitions take their place along other, 
more well-studied behavior such as settlements and product hopping.7 
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
The regulatory structure governing the pharmaceutical industry is 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, which Congress enacted in 1984 to increase 
generic competition and foster innovation.8  Generic drugs have the 
same active ingredients, dosage, administration, performance, and 
safety as patented brand drugs.9  But despite the equivalence, generic 
manufacturers were required, at the time of the Hatch-Waxman Act, to 
engage in lengthy and expensive trials to demonstrate safety and 
effectiveness.10  The FDA approval process took several years, and 
because the required tests constituted infringement of the brand firm’s 
patent covering the drug, generic firms could not begin the process 
during the patent term.11  They therefore waited until the end of the 
term to begin these activities, which prevented them from entering the 
market until two or three years after the patent expired.  At the time 
                                                 
 7. Portions of this Section are adapted from Carrier & Wander, supra note 5. 
 8. For a more comprehensive discussion of the material in this section, see 
Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements:  A Framework for Presumptive 
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 41–45 (2009). 
 9. Understanding Generic Drugs, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesFor 
You/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ (last 
updated Oct. 17, 2016). 
 10. Before Hatch-Waxman was enacted, some generic firms were able to either 
file “paper NDAs,” use the antiquated Abbreviated New Drug Application system, or 
use the monograph system established for generic antibiotics and insulin to avoid 
conducting their own clinical trials.  Edward Tabor, Generic Drug Approvals in the US 
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, REG. FOCUS, Sept. 2008, at 50. 
 11. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS 
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 38 (1998) 
[hereinafter CBO STUDY], https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-
1997-1998/reports/pharm.pdf. 
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Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, there were no generic 
equivalents for roughly 150 drugs whose patent term had lapsed.12 
Congress employed several mechanisms in the Act to promote 
generic competition.  First, the Act allowed generic firms to 
experiment on drugs during their patent terms.13  Second, the Act 
created a new process for generics to obtain FDA approval, 
recognizing a new type of drug application, called an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA).  ANDAs allow generics to rely on 
brand firms’ safety and efficacy studies, dispensing with the need for 
generics to conduct their own lengthy and expensive studies.14  
Finally, the Hatch-Waxman Act granted 180 days of marketing 
exclusivity to the first generic to challenge the validity of a brand 
firm’s patent or claim that the generic did not infringe the patent.15 
B. Generic Entry 
The Hatch-Waxman Act has been successful in increasing generic 
entry, with generic penetration rising from 19% of all prescriptions in 
198416 to 88% as of 2014.17  For the most popular drugs with expired 
patents, the share facing generic competition burgeoned from 35% 
in 1983 to almost 100% today.18 
Generic entry is a pivotal event in a drug’s lifecycle.  When generics 
enter the market, prices can fall dramatically.  The first generic 
entrant prices its product, on average, 5% to 25% lower than the 
                                                 
 12. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650. 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) (exempting from infringement the 
manufacture, use, or sale of a patented invention for uses “reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law” regulating the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs). 
 14. See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:  AN FTC STUDY 5 
(2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-en 
try-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (describing the ANDA 
procedure).  A previous application process with the same name had existed in the 
regulations as early as 1969, but this previous ANDA bears little resemblance to the 
ANDA process established by the Hatch-Waxman Act.  See New Drugs, 34 Fed. Reg. 
2645, 2673 (Feb. 27, 1969) (discussing the creation of the previous ANDA system). 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), (j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). 
 16. See Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace:  A Review 
of the FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 137 (2002) (statement of 
Gregory J. Glover, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America). 
 17. GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 1 (2015), http:// 
www.gphaonline.org/media/wysiwyg/PDF/GPhA_Savings_Report_2015.pdf. 
 18. CBO STUDY, supra note 11, at 37. 
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brand drug.19  The presence of a second generic lowers the price to 
approximately half the brand price.20  In markets in which six or 
more generics enter, the price falls to a quarter of the brand price.21  
One survey showed that patients could save 52% in the daily costs of 
their medications by purchasing generic drugs.22  In fact, even 
though generics make up 80% of prescriptions, they amount to only 
28% of drug costs.23 
In addition, generic drugs quickly take sales from brand drugs.  
Once a generic enters the market, the brand product loses 44% to 
90% of its market share within the first twelve months.24  Generic 
entry is most likely for drugs with large markets, particularly those 
with blockbuster products, but occurs with respect to drugs in 
markets of many sizes.25 
These trends are amplified by health insurance providers’ 
encouragement or requirement of generic drugs.26  All states either 
allow or require pharmacists who receive prescriptions for brand 
drugs to substitute generics.27  Medicaid policies and managed-care 
plans also encourage substitution.28 
                                                 
 19. Id. at xiii; Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/About 
fda/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm 
(last updated May 13, 2015). 
 20. Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 19. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Savings from Generic Drugs Purchased at Retail Pharmacies, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/EmergencyPreparedness/BioterrorismandDrug
Preparedness/ucm134205.htm (last updated May 6, 2016). 
 23. GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, supra note 17, at 1. 
 24. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY:  HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS 
BILLIONS 8 (2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf; CBO 
STUDY, supra note 11, at xiii; see also DOUG LONG, IMS HEALTH, 2003 YEAR IN REVIEW:  
TRENDS, ISSUES, FORECASTS 35 (2004), http://www.piapr.org/index.php?src=docume 
nts&srctype=download&id=38 (providing an overview of generic drug market share 
after first thirteen weeks on the market); Atanu Saha et al., Generic Competition in the 
US Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 15, 29–31 (2006) (examining 
generic drug market share after several months on the market). 
 25. See Fiona M. Scott Morton, Barriers to Entry, Brand Advertising, and Generic Entry 
in the US Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1085, 1102 (2000) (analyzing 
the characteristics of a drug market and how those characteristics predict generic 
drug market entry success); Saha et al., supra note 24, at 27 (emphasizing that the 
size of a brand firm’s drug market, including extremely successful “blockbuster” 
drugs, is key in determining generic drug success). 
 26. Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy 
and Intellectual Property Law:  A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Litigation, 46 IDEA 1, 23 (2005). 
 27. See id. at 23–24 (emphasizing that when a state’s policies and laws permit a 
pharmacist to substitute a generic for a brand firm drug, generic penetration 
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For these reasons, it is in a brand firm’s interests to delay generic 
entry.  Every day a brand firm can control the market and forestall 
entry is a day it can gain monopoly profits.  This is particularly 
tempting in the Hatch-Waxman setting because brands could face 
generic entry before the end of the patent term. 
C. Conduct Delaying Generic Entry 
Because of the dramatic effects of generic competition, brand firms 
have used an array of tactics to delay generic entry.  One activity 
involves patent litigation settlements in which a brand pays a generic 
to settle its lawsuit and refrain from entering the market.  While many 
of these settlements do not raise concern because the parties reach 
an “entry-date” agreement reflecting the strength of the patent, some 
do.  In particular, brand firms have paid generic firms to delay 
entering the market, a practice the Supreme Court held could have 
“significant adverse effects on competition” and violate the antitrust 
laws.29  If a brand is able to prevent a generic from challenging a 
patent and entering the market, it can block not only that company 
but also all other generics from entering.30  Paying a company that 
seeks to invalidate a patent on a drug can delay significant generic 
penetration for an extended period of time. 
Another activity that has raised the concern of delayed generic 
entry is “product hopping,” which refers to a brand’s reformulation 
of its product, often as a patent is about to expire.  Some companies, 
for instance, have switched from a capsule to a tablet—or vice versa—
or from either of these forms to an extended-release drug or 
chewable tablet.31  Much of this product hopping activity has been 
successful because it has avoided the effect of state drug product 
substitution (DPS) laws,32 in effect in all fifty states today, which allow 
or require pharmacists—absent a doctor’s contrary instructions—to 
substitute generic versions of brand-name prescriptions.33  These 
                                                 
increases rapidly); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 
30:  Do We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. 
& ETHICS 293, 312 (2015); see infra text accompanying notes 32–33. 
 28. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 979 n.37 (2003), vacated, 402 
F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 29. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). 
 30. Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 15 (2014). 
 31. E.g., Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3, 31–32 (2009). 
 32. Id. at 13–18. 
 33. Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements:  The 
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017–19 (2010). 
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laws, however, can be evaded when brand firms engage in product 
hopping prior to generic entry.  Switching patients to a new version 
of the drug before generic entry prevents a pharmacist from 
substituting a generic version because the generic is not equivalent to 
the new brand version.34 
A central issue in both settlements and product hopping involves 
timing.  Product hopping is most successful when brand firms not 
only can avoid state DPS laws but also can switch the market before 
generic entry.  Brand firms often stop promoting the old version of 
the drug, switching their marketing to the new product and offering 
the “uncontested message” of the new product’s superiority.35  
Patients who switch to the new drug are unlikely to switch back.36 
Brand firms have employed a combination of settlements and 
product hopping to ensure that they can switch to a new version 
before generics enter the market on the old version, protecting their 
monopoly on the original drug.  The value of this combination is that 
a settlement that prevents patent challenges for a period of time—
even less than the duration of the patent—allows the brand firm to 
switch the market to the new product.  So by the time the generic 
enters years later, the market will have already migrated to the new 
product.  As a result, the generic firm, which can no longer take 
advantage of state DPS laws, fails to provide meaningful downward 
pressure on the brand firm’s new drug price. 
Brand firms’ use of citizen petitions could be a valuable addition to 
this strategy.  By requesting that the FDA make a decision on safety 
and efficacy—often by reviewing a wealth of material and studies—
brands are able to buy additional time in which to delay generic 
entry.  This Article evaluates citizen petitions, presenting original 
data on how they are being used today.  The necessary first step of 
such analysis is a discussion of how we conducted our study. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
This Part explains our methodology.  Section A offers our general 
approach, describing our process for tracking petitions and 
explaining how we narrowed our analysis to a particular category of 
petitions.  Section B explains how we parsed “mixed” decisions, which 
grant in part and deny in part the petition, to determine if the 
petitions were essentially granted or denied.  Section C then presents 
                                                 
 34. Shadowen et al., supra note 31, at 5. 
 35. Id. at 51. 
 36. Id. at 51–55. 
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our methods of analyzing issues related to the complexity and timing 
of the petitions. 
A. General 
We tracked citizen petitions by using the industry-standard 
compilation available at FDA Law Blog.37  This website maintains an 
ongoing record of petitions filed with the FDA.  Known as the FDA 
Citizen Petition Tracker,38 the dataset is regularly updated with newly 
filed petitions as well as the FDA’s disposition of the petitions. 
Given that our previous study concluded in 2010, we begin with 
petitions filed in 201139 and continue through 2015, the last full year 
for which citizen petition information is available. 
Within this timeframe, we focused on petitions in the “Drug” 
category.40  And within this category, we limited our analysis to 
“505(q) petitions.”41  As described in more detail below,42 these 
                                                 
 37. Hyman, Phelps & McNamara, P.C., FDA LAW BLOG, 
http://www.FDAlawblog.net/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 38. The Tracker includes the following data:  Docket Number, Petitioner, 
Product Name/Issue, Category, Petition Type, Receipt Date, Decision Date, and 
Decision.  See FDA Citizen Petition Tracker, FDA LAW BLOG, www.fdalawblog.net/ 
FDA_law_blog_hyman_phelps/files/CPTracker.xls (last updated Nov. 4, 2016).  As 
of August 2, 2016, the Tracker’s dataset had been updated on May 26, 2016; 
November 13, 2015; May 10, 2016; April 20, 2016; and July 25, 2016, for the years 
2011 through 2015, respectively.  See id. 
 39. See Carrier & Wander, supra note 5, at 249 (reviewing citizen petitions filed 
between 2001 and 2010). 
 40. Starting in 2013, the Citizen Petition Tracker began to track all petitions filed 
with the FDA and categorized them under the categories of “Drug,” “Animal Drug,” 
“Food,” “Biologics,” “Dietary Supplement,” “Medical Device,” “Tobacco,” and “Misc.”  
See FDA Citizen Petition Tracker, supra note 38. 
 41. From the Tracker’s 505(q) dataset, we excluded two types of petitions.  First, 
we excluded petitions for which the Tracker noted that the FDA “does not consider 
this a 505(q) petition.” See, e.g., Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-
2012-P-0895-0001 (Aug. 13, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2012-P-0895-0001.  Second, we excluded the two petitions that were withdrawn within 
7 days and refiled.  See Pfizer, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2012-P-0545-0001 (May 
31, 2012) (petition aimed at LYRICA generic withdrawn 7 days later and refiled on 
June 6, 2012); Navinta LLC Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-0072-0001 (Feb. 8, 
2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0702-0001 (petition 
aimed at Venofer generic withdrawn 2 days later and refiled on Feb. 10, 2011). 
In contrast, we included the six petitions for which withdrawal occurred more than 
7 days after the filing.  For example, on July 16, 2012, Purdue Pharmaceuticals filed a 
petition aimed at a generic version of OxyContin.  Purdue Pharma LP Citizen 
Petition 1, No. FDA-2012-P-0760-0001 (July 16, 2012) [hereinafter Purdue Pharma 
Citizen Petition 1], https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-P-0760-
0001.  This petition was withdrawn 79 days later, on October 3, 2012, because Purdue 
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petitions were created to ensure that citizen petitions would not be 
abused to delay generic entry.  Other types of petitions, such as 
ANDA Suitability and reference listed drug (RLD) designation 
petitions, do not immediately pose such a threat and therefore fall 
outside the scope of this study. 
B. Mixed Decisions 
One of the difficulties involved in reviewing FDA rulings on citizen 
petitions is that a number of petitions are not clear grants or denials.  
The FDA sometimes issues “mixed” decisions, which grant in part and 
deny in part the petition.  Although these determinations technically 
are mixed, one of the findings is often a formality that has no 
practical significance.  Continuing the project we began in our 
previous article, we analyzed the mixed decisions from the petitions 
received by the FDA between 2011 and 2015 to determine which of 
the mixed decisions were essentially granted and which were 
essentially denied. 
                                                 
had filed another petition in late August on the same subject matter.  Purdue 
Pharma L.P. Citizen Petition 2, No. FDA-2012-P-0939-0001 (Aug. 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter Purdue Pharma Citizen Petition 2], https://www.regulations.gov/docu 
ment?D=FDA-2012-P-0939-0001.  This petition is worthy of attention because the 
total time of resolution, from the filing of the first petition to the FDA’s denial of the 
second petition, spanned 191 days—more than the statutory 150 days.  See id.  We 
consider the July petition because the withdrawal and refiling of the petitions 
appears to have been strategic, as evidenced by the additional 41 days of FDA 
consideration.  See Purdue Pharma Citizen Petition 1, supra.  In other words, 
Purdue’s petitioning strategy appears to have given the company two bites at the 
apple.  Nor is that all.  Purdue filed a petition for reconsideration in 2013.  See 
Purdue Pharma Citizen Petition 2, supra.  This further reveals the firm’s attempt to 
“double down” and extend the time FDA spent reviewing the challenged generic. 
We found that the other five petitions for which withdrawal occurred more than 7 
days after filing raised similar concerns, and we included them in our dataset.  See 
Duchesnay Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2014-P-1302-0001 (July 11, 2014) (petition 
aimed at DICLEGLIS withdrawn after 70 days); SigmaPharm Laboratories, LLC 
Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-1399-0001 (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.regulations 
.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-1399-0001 (petition aimed at SAPHRIS withdrawn 
after 27 days and immediately refiled); Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Citizen 
Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-1128-0001 (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=FDA-2013-P-1128-0001 (petition aimed at COPAXONE withdrawn after 
113 days); Horizon Pharma, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-1082-0001 (Sept. 
4, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-1082-0001 (petition 
aimed at RAYOS withdrawn after 30 days); Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Citizen 
Petition, No. FDA-2012-P-0295-0001 (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=FDA-2012-P-0295-0001 (petition aimed at ELMIRON withdrawn after 
184 days). 
 42. See infra notes 81–92 and accompanying text. 
CARRIER.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2016  3:28 PM 
2016] CITIZEN PETITIONS 317 
We found that between 2011 and 2015, the FDA issued 23 mixed 
petitions.  Based on a thorough review, we concluded that, of this group, 
the FDA essentially granted 6 petitions and essentially denied 17.43 
1. Essential denials 
The FDA often “grants” requests for additional information 
regarding industry guidance while denying the more substantive aspect 
of the petition.  One example is provided by Physical Pharmaceutica 
                                                 
 43. The following are the 23 mixed petitions and our characterization: 
 
Petition Decision Date Decision 
FDA-2011-P-0127 June 7, 2011 Essentially Granted 
FDA-2011-P-0433 Nov. 21, 2011 Essentially Granted 
FDA-2011-P-0610 July 23, 2014 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2011-P-0767 Apr. 17, 2012 Essentially Granted 
FDA-2012-P-0583 Nov. 30, 2012 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2012-P-0932 Jan. 23, 2013 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2012-P-1087 Mar. 22, 2013 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2012-P-1091 Mar. 29, 2013 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2013-P-0127 Dec. 11, 2014 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2013-P-0371 July 23, 2014 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2013-P-0371 Feb. 9, 2015 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2013-P-0572 Oct. 7, 2013 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2013-P-0664 Oct. 30, 2015 Essentially Granted 
FDA-2013-P-0703 Oct. 25, 2013 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2013-P-0850 Dec. 19, 2013 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2013-P-0995 Sept. 8, 2013 Essentially Granted 
FDA-2013-P-1283 Mar. 12, 2014 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2013-P-1505 Apr. 10, 2014 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2014-P-0304 Nov. 20, 2014 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2014-P-0404 Aug. 29, 2014 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2014-P-1269 Sept. 14, 2015 Essentially Granted 
FDA-2015-P-0065 Feb. 10, 2016 Essentially Denied 
FDA-2015-P-1404 Feb. 10, 2016 Essentially Denied 
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LLC’s and Allergan, Inc.’s separate petitions regarding the multi-
billion dollar immunosuppressant, RESTASIS.44  The companies 
petitioned the FDA to reevaluate its draft bioequivalence 
recommendations and deny ANDAs referencing the brand drug 
RESTASIS that lacked certain additional studies or analysis. 
In a 45-page response, the FDA denied petitioners’ requests for the 
FDA to revise its guidelines for ANDA approval to require additional 
testing to prove bioequivalence.  The agency also denied petitioners’ 
request to reject any ANDAs that lacked this testing.45  And it 
“determined that [the FDA] has clear legal authority to receive and 
approve an ANDA for cyclosporine ophthalmic emulsion that relies 
on” the testing in its bioequivalence guidelines.46 
Despite all of these clear indications that it was denying the 
petition, the FDA also “granted” an aspect of the petition that 
technically put it in the “mixed” category.  The Agency granted 
petitioners’ non-substantive requests to disclose the in vitro 
bioequivalence methods the FDA intended to apply to ANDAs 
referencing RESTASIS and to not approve or receive any ANDA 
referencing RESTASIS unless FDA first responded to a specific test 
conducted by RESTASIS’ sponsor, Allergan.47  This petition only 
sought information from the Agency rather than targeting the 
generic drug itself.  Because the FDA’s decision did not grant any of 
the requests for additional testing by the ANDA applicant and only 
granted the request for more information from the FDA itself, we 
treat the petition as “essentially denied.” 
Another example is provided by a petition filed by Abbott 
Laboratories against testosterone gel AndroGel.48  Abbott asked the 
FDA to revisit its therapeutic equivalence (TE) ratings, which are 
ratings the Agency uses to state that a drug is therapeutically 
equivalent to another drug.  Abbott also requested that the FDA 
require additional bioequivalence studies and refrain from granting 
TE ratings for drugs until it had revised these rules. 
                                                 
 44. See Physical Pharmaceutica LLC Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-1404-0001 
(Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1404-0001; 
Allergan, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2014-P-0304 (Feb. 28, 2014). 
 45. FDA Combined Response to Physical Pharmaceutica LLC and Allergan, Inc. 
Citizen Petitions, FDA, No. FDA 2015-P-1404-0007, at 44 (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1404-0007. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Abbott Laboratories Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-0610-0001 (Aug. 19, 
2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0610-0001. 
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The FDA denied Abbott’s request on the grounds that “additional 
notice-and-comment rulemaking to revisit [the FDA’s] long-established 
approach to TE ratings is not necessary or appropriate.”49  The agency 
also denied Abbott’s lengthy requests for reevaluation of other 
companies’ topical testosterone gel interchangeability status or labels.50 
But the FDA “granted” one aspect of Abbott’s petition.  Because 
possible variations of approved labeling for topical gel testosterone 
products could “cause confusion,” the FDA “intend[ed] to consider 
further these labeling differences in [its] on-going efforts to 
harmonize the approved labeling for drug products in the same 
class.”51  In other words, the FDA denied all the petitioner’s 
substantive requests that would affect competing products while 
merely agreeing to keep certain labeling considerations in mind. 
2. Essential grants 
In other instances, the FDA “essentially grants” petitions that raise 
safety issues.  For example, on May 31, 2011, Lehigh Valley 
Technologies, Inc. (Lehigh) and Glenmark Generics, Inc. 
(Glenmark) jointly filed a petition regarding oxycodone HCl pain 
relievers, such as OxyContin, Roxicodone, and Oxecta.52  The 
petitioners requested that the FDA refrain from approving any ANDA 
or new drug application (NDA) for a single entity oxycodone 
hydrochloride unless the active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”) 
satisfied certain impurity limits.53  The petitioners also requested that 
the API meet these specific impurity limits “under accelerated 
stability conditions for [six] months,” and, in the event any ANDA or 
NDA did not meet such impurity limits, that the FDA stay any 
approval until data was submitted establishing the product’s safety.54 
The FDA agreed with Lehigh and Glenmark that certain impurities in 
opioid substances had been a concern, and that this was the third 
petition to address these impurities.  Because the Agency had been 
                                                 
 49. FDA Response to Abbott Laboratories Citizen Petition, FDA, No. FDA-2011-P-
0610-0010, at 11, 18 (July 23, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2011-P-0610-0010. 
 50. See id. at 23–24, 28–29, 32, 33. 
 51. Id. at 33. 
 52. FDA Response to Lehigh and Glenmark Citizen Petition, FDA, No. FDA-2011-
P-0433-0005, at 1 (Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2011-P-0433-0005. 
 53. Id.  Specifically, Lehigh and Glenmark requested that the API satisfy specific 
impurity limits for α,β-unsaturated ketones (also referred to as “ABUKs”), which the 
FDA refers to as “potentially genotoxic impurities.”  Id. 
 54. Id. 
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working on decreasing impurity levels since 2002, the petitioners’ 
request to require any oxycodone HCl products to establish specific 
impurity limits or submit toxicology studies confirming impurities would 
not be expected to cause cancer or genetic mutations was granted.55 
The FDA, however, denied petitioners’ request that the applicants’ 
impurity profiles match those of the referenced product, explaining 
that it “does not require that ANDA or 505(b)(2) applicants use the 
same chemical synthesis or manufacturing process as . . . the 
referenced product,” and that not all products “should be held to 
identical standards.”56  The FDA also denied petitioners’ request for 
additional stability testing, finding that this was “not likely to provide 
useful data” and stating that, based on the available information, the 
impurities at issue were not expected to increase over time.57 
We characterized this petition as “essentially granted” because the 
FDA agreed with the petitioners that the ANDA applicant must 
establish certain impurity limits before approval.  The Agency agreed 
with the petitioners that “[i]t is in the interests of public health and 
consistent with current Agency policy that applicants for single-
ingredient oxycodone HCl products meet this standard.”58  A 
complete list of our mixed decision judgments can be found in 
footnote 43. 
C. Complexity & Timing 
In addition to mixed decisions, the data we present in Part V calls 
for an additional discussion of methodology.  Once we narrowed the 
universe to 505(q) petitions, we reviewed each petition and compiled 
four types of information. 
First, we gathered data on the petition itself.  This included 
information about the petitioner, the brand product that was the 
subject of the petition, and the type and length of the petition. 
Second, we focused on the brand product that was the subject of the 
petition.  In each citizen petition, a petitioner explains to the FDA the 
actions it is requesting.  In the case of petitions by brand firms, the 
company typically notes that it is the holder of a particular NDA and asks 
the FDA to take a specific action on a pending generic application. 
Once we determined the NDAs that were implicated by the 
petitions, we compiled the following expiration dates:  (1) the listed 
                                                 
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. at 2, 8, 9. 
 57. Id. at 2, 10. 
 58. Id. at 2. 
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patent closest to the petition’s filing date; (2) the last-to-expire listed 
patent, i.e., the “patent cliff” date; (3) the nearest data-exclusivity date59 
to the petition’s filing; and (4) the last-to-expire listed data exclusivity. 
We refer to these four dates as “exclusionary dates.”  We obtained 
these dates from the version of the Orange Book published at the time 
of the petition’s filing.  While some recent versions of the Orange Book 
are available online through an Internet search or by using Internet 
archives, the FDA’s website provides only the most recent Orange 
Book information.  As a result, it can be difficult to obtain data to 
assess those patents and data exclusivities protecting an approved 
drug at the time of a petition’s filing.  Because of these difficulties, we 
filed a Freedom of Information Act Request with the FDA and 
obtained PDF versions of all relevant Orange Books. 
We used these versions to recreate the exclusionary-date 
environment at the time each petition was filed.  For example, if a 
petition was filed on June 1, 2014, we obtained patent and exclusivity 
expiration dates from the Orange Books published in 2013 and 2014.  
Relying on the current version of the Orange Book would have 
yielded incomplete results because the FDA deletes patent and 
exclusivity dates that have expired. 
Third, we obtained information on any approved ANDA referencing 
the brand product at issue.  Because a goal of our study was to assess the 
impact of citizen petitions on generic entry, we utilized the most up-to-
date Orange Book information available on the FDA’s website to 
determine ANDA data.  Specifically, we tracked ANDA approval dates to 
determine how often the FDA resolved a petition on the same day—or 
in the same month—it approved the targeted ANDA.  As we explain 
below,60 this is important because same-day (or same-month) resolution 
raises the prospect of delayed ANDA approval. 
Fourth, and finally, we calculated the time difference between the 
petition’s filing date and each of the four exclusionary dates.  For 
example, if a petition was filed on June 1, 2014, and the only patent 
listed in the 2014 Orange Book for the brand product expired on 
June 8, 2014, the calculated time difference would be 7 days.61 
                                                 
 59. The data-exclusivity date reflects periods of FDA exclusivity.  A company that 
offers a drug with a new active ingredient is entitled to either four or five years of 
exclusivity.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012).  New clinical investigations 
essential to approval, which include new dosage forms, new uses, and adoption of 
over-the-counter status, receive three years of exclusivity.  See id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii). 
 60. See infra Section V.C. 
 61. For an example, consider the pain medication OFIRMEV.  Cadence 
Pharmaceuticals filed a petition on November 4, 2013 regarding a prospective 
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Having narrowed the universe of petitions and obtained crucial data 
points, we found that a significant number of petitions were “late-filed” 
petitions.  We define such petitions as those filed within 6 months of 
an exclusionary date.  While no single number axiomatically provides a 
boundary for the determination of late-filed petitions, a 6-month 
period makes sense because it targets “last-minute” petitions and has 
been used in the pharmaceutical regulatory regime. 
A 6-month period mirrors the timeframe of 180 days within 
which—before being reduced to 150 days in the FDAAA—the FDA 
was required to respond to 505(q) petitions.  And it appears in the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s 180 days of exclusivity reserved for the first 
generic that files a “Paragraph IV” certification that the brand firm’s 
patent is invalid or not infringed.62  Finally, given that generic drugs 
typically take more than two years to develop and obtain FDA 
approval,63 it is reasonable to assume that a petition filed within six 
months of an exclusionary date has the potential to affect a generic 
firm’s development and approval strategy. 
It bears mention that it is difficult for the FDA to provide a rapid 
analysis of science and law in its review of citizen petitions.  This 
difficulty can cause the FDA to delay generic approval. Given that 
brand companies can reap monopoly profits each day generic entry is 
delayed, it is often enough for a brand firm to merely delay generic 
entry rather than prohibit it.  Filing within six months of generic 
approval increases the odds that the filing will delay generic entry. 
It goes without saying that patent protection and data exclusivity 
underpin a drug product’s lifecycle.  We thus assume that the 
                                                 
ANDA.  Cadence Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-1508-0001 
(Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-1508-0001.  
In this case, we looked to the patent and exclusivities listed in the 33rd edition of the 
Orange Book published in 2013 because this would have been the information 
available to the industry at the time of the petition’s filing.  CTR. FOR DRUG 
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (33d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ORANGE BOOK].  Listed under 
OFIRMEV were two U.S. Patents:  U.S. Patent Nos. 6,028,222 (“the ’222 Patent”) and 
6,992,218 (“the ’218 Patent”) expiring on August 5, 2017 and June 6, 2021, respectively.  
Id. at ADA 1.  Also listed under the new product code (“NP”) was an exclusivity of 
November 2, 2013.  Id.  So at the time Cadence filed the petition on November 4, 2013, 
the ’222 Patent was set to expire in 1370 days and the ’218 Patent was set to expire in 
2771 days.  While these expiration dates were far removed, the sole exclusivity listed 
under code NP had expired only 2 days before Cadence filed the petition. 
 62. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 63. See Carrier, supra note 33, at 1018 (explaining that generic firms experience 
delays due to brands’ reformulation, patent litigation, and FDA approval of generics’ 
reformulation). 
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expiration of each of these periods could have a significant effect on 
competition in the market.  In particular, the expiration of a patent 
or the data exclusivity period would be expected to lead to generic 
entry.  And this naturally would result in the erosion of market share 
and a reduction in price, the magnitude of which would depend on 
the number of generics entering the market.64  The filing of a 
petition close to the expiration period offers an indication that such 
expiration was a noteworthy event. 
Because a brand firm will often list multiple patents in the Orange 
Book, a petition might be filed close to the expiration of one while 
another—or several—will not expire for years.  We did not wish to 
introduce additional layers of complexity by examining each of the 
patents to reach an independent conclusion on their relative 
importance.  Such a task would have required reading the patents, 
comparing them to those of rivals, and determining the likelihood of 
infringement.  Further complicating such an analysis is the reality 
that not all patents listed in the Orange Book are litigated. 
As an example of these potential difficulties, a brand firm could list 
multiple patents covering an active ingredient, a method of 
treatment, or a particular formulation.  Although a generic must 
show bioequivalence to the brand product to obtain approval, it does 
not necessarily follow that each patent listed in the Orange Book will 
be infringed.  It thus is a fact-intensive exercise calling for significant 
discretion to determine whether a particular listed patent will be 
subject to litigation.  In addition, some patents may only be 
implicated if the generic seeks approval for a particular indication.  
Similar issues arise with data exclusivity.  All of these considerations 
are case-specific and make it difficult to pinpoint a “most relevant” 
exclusionary date against which to compare a petition filing date. 
As a result, our study took a simple approach to the issue.  If a 
petition is filed within six months of an exclusionary date, we treated 
that date as being noteworthy.  Rather than selecting among 
potential exclusionary dates, we used the actions of the brand—which 
would be aware of the approaching expirations—to determine the 
relevant dates.  And as we show in finding that the FDA denies 98% 
of late-filed petitions,65 the broad universe of exclusionary dates 
seems to be accompanied by petitions filed more to delay generic 
entry than to obtain success on the merits. 
                                                 
 64. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 65. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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III. CITIZEN PETITIONS:  OVERVIEW 
Having explained our methodology, we now provide a more robust 
background on citizen petitions, exploring the industries in which 
they are filed and different categories of petitions.  We then discuss 
congressional reports on the topic before presenting the findings of 
our previous study on citizen petitions. 
A. Background on Citizen Petitions 
The First Amendment ensures that Congress cannot abridge “the 
right of the people . . . to petition the Government” to take a particular 
action.66  In 1946, Congress extended this protection to rules created 
by administrative agencies by enacting the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA),67 which required government agencies to provide the 
public with the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of an administrative rule.68  In accordance with the APA, the 
FDA allows individuals to express safety, scientific, or legal issues 
regarding a product though citizen petitions.69 
Citizen petitions are a means by which any “interested person” can 
request that the FDA “issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order” 
or “take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative 
action.”70  All citizen petitions must include the “[a]ction requested,” 
particularly the “rule, order, or other administrative action” that the 
petitioner seeks to “issue, amend, or revoke.”71  Petitions also must 
disclose a “[s]tatement of grounds,” including “the factual and legal 
grounds on which the petitioner relies.”72 
                                                 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).  This and the following three 
paragraphs are adapted from Carrier & Wander, supra note 5, at 259–60. 
 67. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012)). 
 68. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e); see also Stacey B. Lee, Is a Cure on the Way?—The Bad 
Medicine of Generics, Citizen Petitions, and Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 20 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 98, 108–09 (2010). 
 69. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(a) (2012); The Generic Drug Maze:  Speeding Access to Affordable 
Life-Saving Drugs:  Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) 
[hereinafter Generic Drug Maze Hearing] (statement of Gary Buehler, Director, Office 
of Generic Drugs, FDA), http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hr161g 
b.pdf; see also § 10.30(b)(B) (requiring petitions to state factual and legal grounds for 
requests). 
 70. 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.25, 10.30. 
 71. Id. § 10.30(b)(A); Comment on Proposed Regulations and Submit Petitions, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Dockets/Comments/default.htm (last 
updated Oct. 20, 2014). 
 72. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(b)(B). 
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Citizen petitions additionally must describe any environmental 
effects of the requested action.73  And if requested by the 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, they must address the petitions’ 
economic impact, in particular, effects on “(1) [c]ost (and price) 
increases to industry, government, and consumers; (2) productivity of 
wage earners, businesses, or government; (3) competition; (4) 
supplies of important material, products, or services; (5) 
employment; and (6) energy supply or demand.”74 
Some citizen petitions may raise valid safety concerns, but in many 
cases, they offer little value and the FDA is forced to spend considerable 
time responding to them.  The Agency is required to address the merits 
of every citizen petition submitted, many of which contain “detailed 
analysis and precise scientific documentation” and require review by 
“multiple disciplines within [the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER)],”75 which has led to a backlog at the FDA. 
The FDA’s jurisdiction covers many industries.  Table 1 shows, 
though, that the vast majority of citizen petitions concern drugs.  And 
even though the number of petitions targeting drugs decreased from 
75% in 2013 to 65% in 2015, the industry still provides the setting for 
an overwhelming share of petitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 73. Id. § 10.30(b)(C). 
 74. Id. § 10.30(b)(D). 
 75. Generic Drug Maze Hearing, supra note 69, at 14. 
CARRIER.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2016  3:28 PM 
326 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:305 
Table 1:  Frequency of Citizen Petitions by Industry76 
 
Industry 2013 2014 2015 
Animal Drugs 8 4 1 
Biologics 3 3 3 
Cosmetics 0 0 3 
Device 3 0 3 
Dietary Supplements 2 1 2 
Drug 131 117 92 
Drug/Medical Device 1 0 1 
Drug/Dietary Supplement 0 1 0 
Food 7 16 13 
Food, Dietary Supplement, and Drugs 1 0 0 
Medical Device 14 18 15 
Other 0 1 1 
Tobacco 4 0 1 
Total 174 161 142 
% Drug Petitions 75% 73% 65% 
 
Actors in the pharmaceutical industry have filed various petitions 
that can be subdivided into five different types:  general citizen 
petitions, RLD designation petitions, discontinuation petitions, 
ANDA suitability petitions, and 505(q) certified petitions.  Table 2 
provides a breakdown of these different types. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 76. As noted above, see supra note 40, the FDALawBlog’s Citizen Petition Tracker 
began tracking all types of petitions in 2013.  Before 2013, the Tracker listed only 
505(q) petitions (which by definition occur with respect to drugs), which explains 
why we do not present data from 2011 and 2012 in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 2:  Frequency of Types of Drug Petitions 
 
Type of Drug Petition 2013 2014 2015 
Citizen Petition 42 39 26 
505(q) Certification 37 25 17 
RLD 12 14 18 
Discontinuation 21 13 12 
ANDA Suitability 21 27 16 
Discontinuation/ANDA Suitability 0 0 1 
RLD/Discontinuation 0 1 0 
Advisory Opinion 0 0 1 
Petition for Stay of Action 3 0 0 
 
General citizen petitions raise issues related to safety or industry 
guidelines and are filed by various actors in the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology fields, including drug companies, universities, doctors, 
and public interest groups.77  RLD designation petitions ask that the 
FDA designate a particular approved drug as a reference listed drug 
for the purposes of filing an ANDA.78  Discontinuation petitions require 
that the FDA confirm whether an approved drug product was taken 
off the market for safety or efficacy concerns.79  ANDA suitability 
petitions ask that the FDA confirm whether a prospective generic 
application can consist of certain features.80   505(q) citizen petitions, the 
focus of this Article, ask the FDA to take a particular action against a 
pending generic application and are the petitions brands are most 
likely to file to delay generic entry. 
                                                 
 77. E.g., CUNY School of Public Health & Hunter College Citizen Petition, No. 
FDA-2015-P-1900-0001 (May 27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D= 
FDA-2015-P-1900-0001 (requesting that the FDA mandate certain label language for 
a contraception product). 
 78. E.g., Lachman Consultant Services, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-
1899-0001 (May 27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-
1899-0001. 
 79. E.g., Wiley Rein LLP Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-1752-0001 (May 15, 
2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1752-0001. 
 80. E.g., Qilu Pharmaceutical Co. Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2015-P-1590-
0001 (May 7, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1590-
0001 (requesting FDA permission to file ANDAs on 10 mg/vial and 30 mg/vial for 
new strength formulations while referencing 60 mg/vial brand drug). 
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Section 505(q) appears in section 914 of the FDAAA.81  Congress 
intended for the section to reduce delays from petitions,82 with section 
505(q) applying to “certain petitions that request that the [FDA] take 
any form of action related to a pending ANDA”83 and requiring 
petitioners to certify that they did not delay in filing the petition.84  
The FDAAA mandated that the FDA take final action no later than 180 
days—later shortened to 150 days85—after the petition’s filing date 
unless delay would be necessary to protect the public health. 
As shown below,86 brand firms have filed the vast majority of 505(q) 
petitions.  Petitions filed by brand firms have largely sought to 
require the generic firm to perform additional testing before 
entering the market.  And they have questioned whether generics are 
bioequivalent, in other words, able to deliver the same amount of 
active ingredient to the site of action with the same rate and extent of 
absorption into the body as the brand drug.87 
Generic firms also have filed 505(q) petitions.  In one scenario, 
they have sought to mandate certain types of bioequivalence testing 
on other generic applications.88  In another, first-filing generics have 
requested that the FDA not approve other ANDAs until the end of 
the 180-day exclusivity period.89  In each of these cases, the FDA must 
respond to 505(q) petitions within 150 days of filing.90 
Section 505(q) also grants the FDA power to summarily dispose of 
a petition it finds was filed with the primary intent of delaying the 
approval of a generic and “on its face” does not raise a valid scientific 
                                                 
 81. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2012). 
 82. See 153 CONG. REC. 25,047 (2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch); GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 83. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(H). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 1135, 126 Stat. 993, 1123 (2012) [hereinafter FDASIA]. 
 86. See infra Section IV.A. 
 87. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B). 
 88. E.g., Apotex Corp. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2014-P-0099-0001 (Jan. 13, 
2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-P-0099-0001 
(requesting that the FDA reject new ANDAs unless their bioequivalence studies 
contained a “crossover design”). 
 89. E.g., Sigmapharm Laboratories, LLC Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-1623-
0001 (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-1623-
0001 (petitioning the FDA not to approve other ANDAs for Asenapine Maleate 
Sublingual Tablets). 
 90. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F); see supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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or regulatory concern.91  Despite denying nearly all petitions—as 
shown below92—the FDA has never invoked this power. 
B. Congressional Reports 
The FDAAA mandates that the FDA submit annual reports to 
Congress summarizing trends and data on 505(q) petitions.93  These 
reports must include the number of 505(q) petitions filed, the 
number of applications approved, the number of applications 
delayed due to citizen petitions, and the number of days each 
application was delayed.94  As of the date of this Article, eight reports 
have been submitted to Congress. 
Employing a narrow definition of delay, the reports note that 9 
petitions from fiscal years 2008 through 2015 have caused the FDA to 
delay generic approval.95  According to the reports, these 9 petitions 
delayed the approval of 10 generic drug products.  The amount of 
                                                 
 91. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E). 
 92. See infra Section IV.B. 
 93. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(3). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See FDA, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN 
APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF 
AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 1 (2016) [hereinafter FY 2015 REPORT]; FDA, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS:  SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF 
APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF AGENCY 
ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 1 (2015) [hereinafter FY 2014 REPORT]; FDA, REPORT 
TO CONGRESS:  SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS 
RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2013, at 3 (2014) [hereinafter FY 2013 REPORT]; FDA, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN 
PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 3 
(2013) [hereinafter FY 2012 REPORT]; FDA, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  FOURTH ANNUAL 
REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND 
PETITIONS FOR STAY OF AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 3 (2012) [hereinafter 
FY 2011 Report]; FDA, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN 
APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF 
AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter FY 2010 REPORT]; FDA, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS:  SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF 
APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF AGENCY 
ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 3 (2010) [hereinafter FY 2009 REPORT]; FDA, REPORT 
TO CONGRESS:  ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO 
CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 
3 (2009) [hereinafter FY 2008 REPORT]. 
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delay ranged from 9 days to 138 days.96  The FDA has not indicated 
which generics were delayed. 
In its most recent report to Congress, the FDA stated that it 
“continues to be concerned that section 505(q) may not be 
discouraging the submission of petitions that are intended primarily 
to delay the approval of competing drug products and do not raise 
valid scientific issues.”97  Evidence that citizen petitions are used to 
delay generic entry can be inferred from the vast number of petitions 
that the FDA denies. 
C. Initial Study 
In an earlier study, the first empirical study of citizen petitions, one 
of us reviewed every petition filed with the FDA between 2001 and 
2010.98  We found that petitions increased through the decade, with a 
total of 258 petitions filed.99  We observed that 68% of petitions were 
filed by brand firms, and that more than three-quarters of brand 
petitions targeted generic drugs.100 
We concluded that the FDA granted 19% of citizen petitions and 
denied 81%.101  Generic petitions were more successful, with 28% 
granted and 72% denied, than brand petitions, with 19% granted 
and 81% denied.102 
The study found that the FDAAA had not been successful in reducing 
the number of petitions.  After the legislation was enacted, the average 
number of filings per year increased from 27 to 34.103  Brand petitions 
against generics increased from 9 to 16 per year.104  And the grant rate 
for brand petitions against generics declined from 20% to 19%.105 
This Article picks up where the original study left off.  One change 
in the citizen petition universe is the 2007 enactment of section 
505(q).  Because brand firms sometimes targeted other brands rather 
than generics, our earlier study analyzed the targets of citizen 
petitions.  In contrast, 505(q) petitions, by definition, target generics. 
                                                 
 96. FY 2013 REPORT, supra note 95, at 3 (25 days); FY 2011 REPORT, supra note 95, 
at 3 (78 days); FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 95, at 3 (9 days); FY 2009 REPORT, supra 
note 95, at 4 (27 days); FY 2008 REPORT, supra note 95, at 4 (138 days). 
 97. FY 2015 REPORT, supra note 95, at 8. 
 98. Carrier & Wander, supra note 5, at 249. 
 99. Id. at 270. 
 100. Id. at 270–71. 
 101. Id. at 274. 
 102. Id. at 275–76. 
 103. Id. at 282. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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IV. GRANTS/DENIALS 2011–2015 
This Part offers empirical research on the FDA’s grants and denials 
of citizen petitions between 2011 and 2015.  It begins by exploring 
the total number of 505(q) petitions.  And it then surveys petitions’ 
success rate in general and among brand firms in particular. 
A. Total 505(q) Petitions 
We begin with the total number of 505(q) citizen petitions filed each 
year from 2011 through 2015.  Table 3106 presents every petition labeled 
“Citizen Petition (505(q) Certification)” that appeared in the FDA 
Citizen Petition Tracker.107  In the five-year period, between 17 and 37 
petitions were filed each year.  The mean and median number of filings 
was 25.  The filings peaked in 2013, with 37, and fell to 17 in 2015. 
Table 3 further breaks down the identity of the party that files 
505(q) petitions.  Of the 124 petitions, there were 118 different 
filers.108  Table 3 shows that brand companies file the vast majority, 
92%, of 505(q) petitions.  The other 8% were filed by generics 
challenging the entry of competing generics or interest groups 
challenging drug safety.  For example, a generic firm could file a 
petition relating to ANDA suitability, such as when it requests the 
FDA to allow the generic to differ from the reference drug.  These 
types of petitions do not present similar anticompetitive concerns 
and lie outside the scope of this study. 
The observation that brand firms file more than 9 out of 10 505(q) 
petitions raises concern.  If 505(q) petitions were serving their 
intended purpose of ensuring the safety and efficacy of generic 
drugs, we should observe interest groups and competing generic 
firms filing a significant share of the petitions.  That is not the case.109 
                                                 
 106. Infra note 110. 
 107. FDA Citizen Petition Tracker, supra note 38. 
 108. The 124 petitions were filed between 2011 and 2015.  The lower figure of 79 
petitions in Table 2 reflects those filed between 2013 and 2015.  See supra note 76. 
 109. It is conceivable that interest groups and competing generic firms could file 
fewer 505(q) petitions as a result of filing petitions at other times.  Filing petitions 
that challenge safety or efficacy at times when there is not a pending ANDA could 
potentially displace 505(q) petitions. 
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Table 3:  505(q) Petitions and Petitioners by Year110 
 
Year 
Total 
Number of 
Petitions 
Number of 
Petitioners 
Brand 
Petitions 
Generic/Other 
Petitions 
2011 18 18 17 1 
2012 27 26 24 2 
2013 37 32 30 2 
2014 25 25 21 4 
2015 17 17 16 1 
Total 124 118 108 10 
Percentage 100% 92% 8% 
 
B. Success Rate 
Our previous study found that the FDA denied 81% of petitions, 
granting only 19%.111  Remarkably, the grant rate has fallen significantly, 
even from that low rate.  Between 2011 and 2015, the FDA issued 109 
substantive decisions.112  Table 4 shows that the FDA issued 3 outright 
grants and 83 outright denials.  The remaining 23 decisions were 
mixed decisions.113 
                                                 
 110. In 2012 and 2013, there were more petitions than petitioners because a 
petitioner filed multiple petitions.  For example, in 2012, Purdue Pharma filed two 
petitions targeting a generic version of OxyContin.  See supra note 41; see also Purdue 
Pharma Citizen Petition 2, supra note 41, at 1, 2 (showing the second of Purdue’s two 
petitions, which is identical to the first petition except for its filing date and an 
updated 505(q) statement that targeted a generic version of OxyContin).  As a result, 
in 2012, there were 26 petitioners and 27 petitions.  Likewise, in 2013, three 
petitioners filed two petitions each and one filed three petitions.  E.g., Novartis 
Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-0247-0001 (Mar. 4, 2013), https://www.regulations 
.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-0247-0001; Novartis Supplement and Petition for 
Reconsideration, No. 2013-P-0247-0004 (Aug. 23, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov 
/document?D=FDA-2013-P-0247-0004.  As a result, in 2013, there were 32 petitioners 
and 37 petitions. 
 111. See Carrier & Wander, supra note 5, at 274 tbl.3. 
 112. While 124 505(q) petitions were filed between 2011 and 2015, the FDA issued 
only 109 substantive decisions during that period.  See supra Table 3 (showing the 
number of petitions filed from 2011 to 2015); infra Table 4 (providing the total 
number of substantive decisions). 
 113. Table 4 does not include petitions that were withdrawn or are pending, or 
where the FDA issued an interim response with no substantive decision.  There were 
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Table 4:  Success Rate of Citizen Petitions by Year114 
 
Year Petitions Granted Petitions Denied Mixed 
2011 2 12 4 
2012 1 19 4 
2013 0 23 10 
2014 0 17 4 
2015 0 12 1 
Total 3 83 23 
 
The recoding of mixed decisions as essentially granted or denied 
underscores even more emphatically the low probability of success.  
As we showed above,115 careful analysis of the 23 mixed decisions 
reveals 6 essential grants and 17 essential denials.116  Incorporating 
these mixed decisions, there were a total of 9 grants and 100 denials. 
Figure 1 presents these results graphically.  From 2011 through 
2015, the denial rate ranged between 72% and 100% each year.  In 
fact, the denial rate increased markedly from 72% in 2011 to 96%, 
94%, 95%, and 100% from 2012 to 2015.  In these four years, there 
were only 1, 2, 1, and 0 petitions granted, respectively.117  In total, the 
FDA granted only 8% of 505(q) petitions, denying a full 92%. 
                                                 
16 such petitions.  As for withdrawn petitions, we recorded 0, 2, 3, 1, and 0 in the 
years 2011 through 2015 respectively. As for interim decisions, we recorded 0, 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 petitions from 2011 through 2015 respectively. 
  The grant and denial data differ slightly from what the FDA reported to 
Congress.  One reason for the discrepancy is that the FDA’s reporting period runs 
from October through September, while our data consists of petitions filed in a 
calendar year.  In addition, we more closely parse mixed decisions.  While the FDA 
reports merely state that a petition was resolved in part, our study looks more closely 
at the actual resolution.  Since 2008, the FDA has reported that 68% of 505(q) 
petitions were denied, 5% granted, and 26% granted/denied in part.  It is this 26% 
percent that we closely analyze and include in our grant/denial data.  To reconcile 
the figures, going forward we suggest that the FDA release a list of citizen petitions 
along with its annual FDA report to Congress. 
 114. The number of denials and grants may differ from the number of petitions 
filed because the FDA may issue multiple decisions on a petition.  E.g., Auxilium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-0371 (Mar. 26, 2013), 
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=FDA-2013-P-0371 (including Auxilium’s 
petition targeting testosterone gel Testim and both of FDA’s mixed, “essentially 
denied” responses from July 23, 2014 and February 9, 2015). 
 115. See supra Section II.B. 
 116. See supra note 43 (providing conclusions on the 23 decisions). 
 117. See supra Table 4 and note 43.  The categories “granted” and “denied” 
include mixed decisions that we determined to be essentially granted/denied.  See id. 
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Figure 1:  Success Rate of Citizen Petitions by Year118 
 
C. Brand Win Rate 
The success rate in the previous Section applies to all 505(q) 
petitions.  Given that brand firms present the most direct concern of 
delaying generic entry, we examined the success rate of petitions filed 
by a brand firm. 
Between 2011 and 2015, the FDA considered 108 brand petitions.  
Of this universe—and not counting the 5 petitions that were 
withdrawn or are pending, or for which the FDA issued an interim 
response with no substantive decision—Figure 2 shows that the 
Agency granted 9 petitions (9%) and denied 94 (91%). 
Because the number of 505(q) petitions not filed by brands is 
minimal, the results in this section are similar to those for all 505(q) 
petitions.  As a point of comparison, the previous study showed that 
from 2001 through 2010, the FDA granted 22 brand firm petitions 
(19%) while denying 96 (81%).119  Tracking the increased number of 
total 505(q) denials in the past five years,120 the brand firm success 
rate of 9% is roughly half of what it was in the previous decade.  In 
particular, the brand success rates from 2011 through 2015 were 
                                                 
 118. See supra Table 4 for figures on grants and denials and note 43 for mixed 
decisions. 
 119. See Carrier & Wander, supra note 5, at 275. 
 120.  See supra Table 4. 
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28%, 4%, 7%, 5%, and 0%, with denial rates of 72,%, 96%, 93%, 
95%, and 100%. 
Figure 2:  Brand Win Rate by Year 
 
V. REASONS FOR INCREASINGLY QUESTIONABLE PETITIONS 
Why have the grant rates fallen by more than half from the already-
low 19% rate between 2001 and 2010?  This Part explores three 
potential reasons.  First, petitions are getting more complex.  Second, 
many petitions are filed at the last minute, shortly before the expiration 
of a patent or FDA exclusivity period.  Third, the FDA resolves some 
petitions on the same day it approves the targeted generic. 
A. Petition Complexity 
Citizen petitions are inherently complex and challenging because 
they allege that a pending generic does not meet pharmacokinetic 
and bioequivalence standards.  The FDA, for obvious reasons, takes 
seriously petitions that claim that a potential generic drug poses 
safety concerns.  With this in mind, petitioners seeking to delay or 
block a generic application—and keep their market share as a 
result—have an incentive to increase the complexity of their petitions 
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to prolong FDA scrutiny.121  For a blockbuster billion-dollar drug, 
delayed entry means millions of dollars extra each day. 
We hypothesized that complex petitions could be used as a tool to 
complicate and delay generic entry.  In the fact-specific setting of 
citizen petitions, complexity is difficult to quantify.  As a proxy for 
complexity, we considered the one metric we could evaluate:  petition 
length.  All else equal, longer petitions would tend to slow down the 
FDA, which is forced to spend more resources reviewing lengthy 
petitions.  In fact, congressional reports have repeatedly explained 
that complex petitions are draining the agency of time and resources 
better allocated to other functions.122 
Along those lines, it is concerning that, as seen in Table 5, the 
average length of a 505(q) petition has more than doubled from 
2011 to 2015, from roughly 14 to 32 pages.123  This trend is 
accelerating, increasing between 2011 and 2015 from 14 to 21, 21, 26, 
and 32 pages. 
Table 5:  Average Page Length of Citizen Petitions by Year 
Year Average Page Length 
2011 14 
2012 21 
2013 21 
2014 26 
2015 32 
 
While petitioners could conceivably claim that longer petitions reflect 
increased complexity and therefore more legitimate petitions that have 
a greater likelihood of success, the reality is the opposite.  In fact, 
petitions that are longer than average show a reduced likelihood of 
success, even in a universe in which only 8% of petitions are granted. 
In a remarkable finding, as shown in Table 6, only 1 petition with a 
page length above the mean was granted in five years.  Not including 
                                                 
 121. In certain cases, in fact, the FDA asserts that additional time is needed to 
evaluate the complex issues raised by a petition. 
 122. See FY 2014 REPORT, supra note 95, at 7 (declaring that the FDA “redirect[ed] 
efforts” to comply with statutory time constraints for citizen petition responses, and 
implying that section 505(q) might contribute to better allocation of resources). 
 123. We ignored differences between single-spaced and double-spaced petitions, 
and also did not include appendices, which are less likely to receive careful attention, 
in the page count. 
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the 9 petitions in the “other” category—which were subject to an 
interim response or withdrawn—the ratio of 1 grant to 30 denials, for 
an anemic grant rate of 3%, speaks volumes. 
Table 6:  Results for Petitions Exceeding the Mean Page Length by Year 
 
Year Granted Denied Other124 
2011 1 5 0 
2012 0 9 1 
2013 0 8 3 
2014 0 5 2 
2015 0 3 3 
Total 1 30 9 
 
A review of the petitions that have been granted shows a higher 
success of shorter petitions.  In 2011, when the average page length 
was 14, the 5 granted petitions were 12, 22, 6, 5, and 8 pages long.125  
In 2012, when the average page length was 21, the only granted 
petition was 7 pages long.126  In 2013, when the average page length 
was 21, the two granted petitions were 13 and 5 pages long.127  And in 
2014, when the average page length was 26, the only granted petition 
was 15 pages long.128  In sum, long petitions seem geared not to 
                                                 
 124. The “Other” category includes withdrawals and interim responses. 
 125. See Somaxon Pharmaceuticals Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-0767-0001 
(Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0767-0001 
(12 pages); Warner Chilcott Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-0575-0001 (Aug. 1, 
2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0575-0001 (22 pages); 
Lehigh Valley Technologies, Inc. and Glenmark Generics, Inc. USA Citizen Petition, 
No. FDA-2011-P-0433-0003 (May 31, 2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document? 
D=FDA-2011-P-0433-0003 (6 pages); Baxter Healthcare Citizen Petition, No. FDA-
2011-P-0127-0001 (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2011-P-0127-0001 (5 pages); Pronova BioPharma Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-
0120-0001 (Feb. 28, 2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-
0120-0001 (8 pages). 
 126. See Laboratorios SALVAT Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2012-P-0647-0001 (June 
19, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-P-0647-0001. 
 127. See SUBOXONE Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-0995-0001 (Aug. 12, 2013), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-0995-0001 (13 pages); 
Watson Laboratories, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-0664-0001 (June 4, 
2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-0664-0001 (5 pages). 
 128. See Pfizer Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2014-P-1269-0001 (Aug. 18, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-P-1269-0001.  No petitions 
were granted in 2015. 
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raising legitimate safety concerns but to bogging down the FDA and 
delaying generic entry. 
B. Petitions and Exclusionary Dates 
In addition to long petitions, we examined the point in a brand drug’s 
lifecycle when a 505(q) petition is filed.  We hypothesized that brands 
were filing petitions shortly before the expiration of a patent or data 
exclusivity.  To test this hypothesis, we examined the 129 NDAs protected 
by the 124 petitions filed between 2011 and 2015.129  In particular, we 
focused on exclusionary dates when these 129 NDAs would lose their 
“protected status” as a result of the approval of a pending generic. 
We found that of the 129 protected NDAs, a petition was filed within a 
“late-filed” window of 6 months of an exclusionary date—either patent- 
or exclusivity-related—in 50 cases, or 39%.  Of this 39%, 19% had a 
petition filed within 6 months of a patent expiration date, 24% 
witnessed a petition within 6 months of a data exclusivity date, and 4% 
had a petition filed within 6 months of both a patent expiration date 
and a data exclusivity date.130  Table 7 presents our findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 129. There are more NDAs implicated than number of petitions because a single 
petition can refer to more than one NDA.  See, e.g., Watson Laboratories, Inc. Citizen 
Petition, supra note 127, at 2 (implicating NDA 020756 and NDA 020701). 
 130. The 39% figure is reached by combining the 19% and 24% figures and (to 
avoid double-counting) subtracting the 4%. 
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Table 7:  Petitions and Exclusionary Dates131 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Number of Protected NDAs 22 30 32 25 20 129 
Within 6 Months of Nearest Patent 
2 
(8%) 
3 
(10%) 
7 
(22%) 
5  
(20%) 
4 
(20%) 
21 
(16%) 
Within 6 Months of Final Patent 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3%) 
2 
(8%) 
1 
(5%) 
4  
(3%) 
Within 6 Months of Nearest 
Exclusivity 
4 
(18%) 
2 
(7%) 
5 
(16%) 
3 
(12%) 
2 
(10%) 
16 
(12%) 
Within 6 Months of Final Exclusivity 3  
(14%) 
5 
(17%) 
6 
(19%) 
1 
(4%) 
1 
(5%) 
16 
(12%) 
Within 6 Months of Patent and 
Exclusivity Date 
2 
(9%) 
1 
(3%) 
2 
(6%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
5  
(4%) 
Within 6 Months of an Exclusionary 
Date 
6  
(27%) 
9 
(30%) 
17 
(53%) 
10 
(40%) 
8 
(32%) 
50132 
(39%) 
 
Of the 19% of petitions filed within 6 months of a patent 
expiration date, 16% of NDAs witnessed a petition filed within 6 
months of the nearest expiration, while 3% had a petition filed 
within 6 months of the last expiration (“patent cliff”). 
The prevalence of patents filed within 6 months of the nearest 
patent, rather than the patent cliff, makes sense.  Research and 
development takes time and a brand firm’s most important 
discovery—for which it invariably obtains patent protection—is the 
active ingredient compound.  Because patents can be granted long 
before the FDA approval process begins, those claiming the active 
                                                 
 131. We avoid double-counting in the Table in several ways.  First, we do not 
double-count protected NDAs for which a petition was filed within six months of the 
final patent that also was the nearest patent.  We include that scenario only in the 
“final patent” row.  We apply the same treatment to instances in which the final 
exclusivity date is also the nearest exclusivity date.  Finally, in settings in which 
petitions fall within 6 months of both patent and data exclusivity expiration dates, we 
include that only in the penultimate row of the table. 
 132. The total of 50 petitions within 6 months of an exclusionary date is reached 
by (1) adding the 25 petitions filed within 6 months of a patent expiration to (2) the 
32 petitions filed within 6 months of an exclusivity date, (3) subtracting the 5 
petitions filed within 6 months of a patent expiration date and exclusivity date, and 
(4) subtracting the 2 petitions that were each filed within 6 months of two separate 
exclusionary dates.  See, e.g., Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Citizen Petition, 
No. FDA-2014-P-1649-0001 (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document 
?D=FDA-2014-P-1649-0001 (focusing on FUSILEV and representing a petition filed 
within 154 days of nearest exclusivity date and 178 days of final exclusivity date); 
Perrigo Co. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-0840-0001 (Nov. 18, 2011), https:// 
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0840-0001 (addressing Prevacid 
24HR, NDA 020406, and representing a petition filed within 21 days of nearest 
exclusivity date and 162 days of final exclusivity date). 
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ingredient are promptly listed in the Orange Book after the drug’s 
approval.  But because the term of that patent began to run years 
earlier, it could expire around the time data exclusivity runs out.  
These active-ingredient patents expire first because the drug product 
tends to be discovered—and the patent term begins to run—years 
before the review and approval phase. 
In contrast, last-to-expire patents—in other words, those making up 
the “patent cliff”—typically do not cover a product’s main active 
ingredient but instead claim secondary subject matter related to the 
process of how the drug can be formulated.133  Because a brand firm 
can list a patent in the Orange Book at any point, it will continue 
prosecuting these secondary patents throughout the drug’s lifecycle 
and list those patents many years after data exclusivity or main active 
ingredient patents expire.134 
These observations on the nature of drug patents are consistent 
with our findings.  A petition challenging that approval process is 
more likely to occur closer to the expiration of nearest patents.  This 
aligns with our findings of more petitions being filed within six 
months of the nearest, rather than final, patent. 
With regards to exclusionary dates related to data exclusivity, we 
determined that 12% of protected NDAs had a petition filed within 6 
months of their nearest exclusivity date, and 12% of NDAs had a 
petition filed within 6 months of the latest exclusivity to expire.  And 
                                                 
 133. For example, in the case of ABILIFY, Otsuka Pharmaceuticals filed a petition 
within 40 days of the expiration of U.S. Patent No. 5,006,528, which claims a 
compound.  See Otsuka Pharmaceutical Development & Commercialization, Inc. 
Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2014-P-1354-0001 (Sept. 10, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-P-1354-0001.  The last-to-
expire patent for ABILIFY listed in the 2014 Orange Book, however, was slated to 
expire more than 3000 days later, on December 16, 2024.  CTR. FOR DRUG 
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at ADA 16 (34th ed. 2014).  The patent that will expire 
on December 16, 2024, U.S. Patent No. 8,017,615 (“the ’615 Patent”), claims a 
process for developing a pharmaceutical preparation.  To state the obvious, the ’615 
Patent is not as strong as a patent claiming a compound because the ’615 Patent 
claims a process.  See MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE:  UNDERSTANDING 
PATENTS, FDA AND PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 70 (4th ed. 2014) 
(explaining that “[t]he best pharmaceutical patent is a compound patent . . . 
[because] it covers a drug product no matter how it is formulated, no matter how it 
is made, no matter what it is sold for and no matter what use it is put to”). 
 134. See, e.g., Mylan Specialty, LP Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-0181-0001 (Jan. 
16, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-0181-0001 
(representing a petition aimed at Mylan’s EpiPen, which had Orange Book-listed 
patents appear for the first time in 2009—more than two decades after EpiPen was first 
approved in 1987). 
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4% had a petition filed within 6 months of both a patent expiration 
date and a data exclusivity date. 
Eliminating duplication in cases in which there was both patent and 
data exclusivity, we conclude that 39% of all protected brand products—
i.e., those products likely to lose market share as a result of the generic 
application at issue—witnessed a 505(q) petition filed within 6 months 
of an exclusionary date.  Such a finding raises a question as to whether 
the petitions were related to safety concerns or whether they were just 
another tool in the toolkit of “lifecycle management,” less charitably 
known as potentially anticompetitive behavior. 
Strikingly, as seen in Table 8, the FDA denied 49 of 50 petitions 
filed within 6 months of a protected NDA’s exclusionary date.135  This 
paltry 2% grant rate further supports our hypothesis that late-filed 
petitions almost never raise valid safety concerns. 
Table 8:  Grant/Denial of Petitions Filed Within 6 Months of Exclusionary 
Date 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Grant 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Denial 6 9 16 10 8 49 
C. Same-Day Resolution of Petition and ANDA Approval 
Another concerning aspect of petitions is the FDA’s resolution of 
them on the same day, or in the same month, that it approves the 
ANDA for the targeted generic product.  The concern in this 
scenario is that generic entry could be delayed because the FDA does 
not approve the ANDA until it resolves the citizen petition.136 
                                                 
 135. For the sole grant, see SUBOXONE Citizen Petition, supra note 127 
(containing a mixed, “essentially granted” decision, in which the FDA decided that 
an application seeking approval for generic SUBOXONE should include data 
proving minimal impurities). 
 136. The Second Circuit rejected a claim that a brand firm’s citizen petition 
amounted to sham litigation on the grounds that the FDA resolved a citizen petition 
on the same day the ANDA was approved.  Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 
823 F.3d 51, 59, 60 (2d Cir. 2016) (reasoning that the Agency’s guidance on 505(q) 
petitions “tends to undermine the inference . . . that when a citizen petition is 
denied simultaneously with the grant of an ANDA petition, the citizen petition was a 
sham and an anticompetitive weapon”).  But even if the confluence of FDA 
resolution of a petition and ANDA approval does not automatically demonstrate that 
litigation is a sham (based on a test with rigorous objective and subjective 
components), it still could support a finding of delayed generic entry. 
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As we show in Table 9, the FDA approved 23 targeted ANDAs 
within one month after it resolved a petition raising concerns about 
the ANDA.  Of these 23 ANDAs, 6 were approved on the same day 
the FDA resolved the petition targeting the generic.  The 11 petitions 
affected an additional 17 ANDAs, which were approved within one 
month of the ruling on the petition.  In every case where same-day (or 
even same-month) resolution and generic approval occurred, the 
505(q) petition was denied. 
This trend has increased recently, with the FDA approving 3 ANDAs 
on the same day it resolved a related petition in 2015.  This reflects as 
many same-day resolutions as the previous 4 years combined. 
Table 9:  Same-Month Resolution of Petitions and ANDA Approval 
Year 
Number of 
Petitions 
ANDA 
Approved on 
Same Day 
Additional 
ANDAs 
Approved 
within One 
Month 
Petitions 
Granted 
2011 4 2 13137 0 
2012 1 1 0 0 
2013 1 0 1 0 
2014 0 0 0 0 
2015 5 3 3 0 
Total 11 6 17 0 
 
While it is difficult to precisely delineate causation, the mere fact 
that the FDA waits to approve an ANDA until it denies a citizen 
petition raises concerns.  It makes sense that the FDA would not be 
willing to grant generic approval until it resolves safety issues.  If the 
FDA has not resolved an issue related to the bioequivalence of a 
generic drug, it cannot approve the ANDA. 
But the FDA may be hesitant to deny a citizen petition early on the 
grounds that this would give the brand firm the ability to challenge the 
denial in court.  The denial of a citizen petition is a final agency action 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, which means that an Article III 
court can review and reverse the agency’s determination.  Challenging 
                                                 
 137. This number is high because on March 27, 2011, the FDA approved 10 
separate generics referencing AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals’ SEROQUEL.  This high 
number appears to be an outlier among the data. 
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the FDA’s actions in court provides the brand company with another 
avenue to delay entry of the generic drug through legal proceedings. 
As a result, the FDA may have adopted a preferred strategy of (1) 
denying a citizen petition and (2) approving a generic drug on the 
same day.  One interpretation of this simultaneous resolution is that 
the petition does not delay generic entry because approval comes no 
later than the resolution of the petition.  As a result of simultaneous 
resolution, moreover, the brand may not have an incentive to appeal 
in court because the generic has already penetrated the market, with 
the “damage” having already occurred.  But another interpretation is 
that the FDA’s resolution of the citizen petition within the same 
month—or especially on the same day—that it grants ANDA approval 
reveals that the FDA delayed approval until it dealt with the petition. 
The cases involving simultaneous resolution in 2015 provide 
examples of potential delay.  In that year, 3 of the 5 petitions that the 
FDA resolved in the same month that it approved the ANDA were filed 
within 6 months of an exclusionary date.138  As for the other two 
petitions, one dealt with Teva’s multi-billion-dollar drug COPAXONE.  
As we discuss below,139 Teva filed eight separate petitions asking the 
FDA to take actions on any ANDA referencing COPAXONE.  The fifth 
petition was resolved four days before ANDA approval.140  Again, as it 
did in every case in which the FDA resolved a petition within the same 
month it approved the generic, it denied the petition. 
                                                 
 138. Teva Pharmaceuticals filed a petition within 36 days of an exclusivity date 
protecting TREANDA.  See Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. Citizen Petition, No. 
FDA-2015-P-3980-0001 (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=F 
DA-2015-P-3980-0001.  The FDA ultimately denied this petition on March 24, 2016—
the same day that it approved two generics:  ANDA 204771 and ANDA 205476.  
Because one petition targeted 2 generics, there are more ANDAs (6) than petitions 
(5) in 2015.  And Helsinn Healthcare filed two separate 505(q) petitions targeting a 
proposed generic for ALOXI within 30 days of the nearest patent listed in the 
Orange Book.  See Helsinn Healthcare SA Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-1722-
0001 (May 13, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1722-
0001; Helsinn Healthcare SA Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-1721-0001 (May 13, 
2015) [hereinafter Helsinn Citizen Petition 1], https://www.regulations.gov/docum 
ent?D=FDA-2015-P-1721-0001.  The FDA denied these petitions on October 9, 2015 
and approved two generics four days later on October 13, 2015:  ANDA 202521 and 
ANDA 090713. 
 139. See infra Section VI.A.  On April 1, 2015, Teva filed the last of its 8 petitions 
targeting Sandoz’s generic application referencing COPAXONE.  Fifteen days later, 
on April 16, 2015, the FDA denied the petition and simultaneously approved 
Sandoz’s ANDA. 
 140. See Helsinn Citizen Petition 1, supra note 138. 
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One explanation for the increase in same-day resolution of petition 
and ANDA approval may be the FDA’s recent backlog in generic 
applications.  Recently, approval timelines for ANDAs “have slowed 
from 30 months to 48 months.”141  Time will tell whether 2015 marks 
a trend of increasing simultaneous resolution. 
VI. CASE STUDIES 
The concerns mentioned above are not hypothetical.  This Part 
introduces four case studies that illustrate the role citizen petitions 
play in brand firms’ toolkits to delay and block generic competition 
towards the end of a product’s lifecycle.  It provides examples of (1) 
serial petitions; (2) egregious examples of citizen petition filings 
close to exclusionary dates; (3) the combination of citizen petitions 
and product hopping; and (4) the combination of citizen petitions 
and drug patent settlements. 
A. COPAXONE:  Serial Petitions 
In patent law, certain case names—such as Markman, Festo, and 
Panduit—instantly became classics.  In 2015, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA 
v. Sandoz, Inc.142 joined that list when the Supreme Court held that a 
district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters made in the 
course of its construction of a patent claim are reviewed for clear 
error and not de novo.143  Underlying this important ruling is a story 
of Teva’s robust life cycle management of COPAXONE—the $3 
billion per year multiple sclerosis drug. 
First approved in December 1996, Teva faced intense market pressure 
to combat generic entry as its data exclusivity was due to expire in the 
mid-2000s and patent protection would lapse in 2014.144  Once generic 
firms filed for approval, Teva initiated patent litigation under the Hatch-
Waxman Act.145  But in addition to litigation, the company—in an action 
                                                 
 141. Zachary Brennan, FDA’s Woodcock:  Generic Drug Application Backlog Will Be 
Eliminated Before GDUFA II, RAPS (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2016/01/28/24195/FDA%E2%80%99s-Woodcock-Generic-Drug-
Application-Backlog-Will-be-Eliminated-Before-GDUFA-II/. 
 142. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 143. Id. at 836, 840. 
 144. Steven Ross Johnson, First Generic for MS Drug Copaxone Launches in U.S., MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (June 19, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150619 
/NEWS/150619886; Gene Quinn, Teva Sues Mylan over Multiple Sclerosis Drug 
Copaxone, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 18, 2009), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/10/18/ 
teva-sues-mylan-over-multiple-sclerosis-drug-copaxone/id=6712. 
 145. Quinn, supra note 144. 
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that has not received much attention—also filed eight separate citizen 
petitions with the FDA from 2008 through 2015.146 
Teva’s efforts to protect COPAXONE present a particularly glaring 
example of a company’s aggressive use of the citizen petition process.  
For starters, there were two petitions of more than 130 pages in 
length.147  And in each of the eight petitions,148 Teva argued that the 
FDA should refuse to approve a generic version of COPAXONE—
unless certain criteria were met—because the drug was highly 
complex and therefore no generic could produce the same active 
ingredient.149  One aspect that Teva continually stressed was the lack 
of bioequivalence testing available for non-biological complex 
drugs.150  The FDA nonetheless denied each of the eight petitions.  
The final denial came on the same day the FDA approved Sandoz’s 
ANDA.151 
                                                 
 146. FDA Approves a Generic for Teva’s Copaxone, Bringing Longstanding Regulatory 
Battles near an End, PHARMACEUTICAL COM. (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.pharmaceuti 
calcommerce.com/latest-news/fda-approves-a-generic-for-tevas-copaxone-bringing-
longstanding-regulatory-battles-near-an-end/. 
 147. See Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-1050-0001 (Apr. 1, 
2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1050-0001 (133 pages); 
Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2014-P-0933-0001 (July 2, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-P-0933-0001 (132 pages). 
 148. See, e.g., Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-1050-0001 
(Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1050-0001; 
Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2014-P-0933-0001 (July 2, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-P-0933-0001; Teva 
Pharmaceuticals Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-1641-0001 (Dec. 5, 2013), https:// 
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-1641-0001; Teva Neuroscience, Inc. 
Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2013-P-1128-0001 (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.regulation 
s.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-1128-0001; Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, 
No. FDA-2012-P-0555-0001 (June 4, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/document? 
D=FDA-2012-P-0555-0001; Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2010-P-
0642-0001 (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2010-P-
0642-0001; Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2009-P-0555-0001 
(Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2009-P-0555-0001; 
Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2008-P-0529-0001 (Sept. 26, 2008), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2008-P-0529-0001. 
 149. Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-1050-0001, at 2–4 (Apr. 
1, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1050-0001 (asserting 
that the complexity of COPAXONE includes unknown characteristics that are related to 
its safety and efficacy, so a generic could not contain the same active ingredient). 
 150. See id. (explaining that the scientific community does not yet know what type 
of tests or how much information is needed to determine bioequivalence for non-
biological complex drugs like COPAXONE, and recognizing that all of the 
biologically active parts of a complex drug might need to be identified before 
establishing bioequivalence standards). 
 151. Compare GLATOPA, DRUGS @ FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/ 
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Looking forward, this type of serial petitioning may herald the wave 
of the future in the emerging biosimilar industry.  As of mid-2016, the 
majority of citizen petitions in the biosimilar industry have dealt with 
FDA labeling regulations.152  Because biosimilars aim to be similar 
and not identical to brand biologics, it is quite likely we will see more 
brand firms filing citizen petitions similar to those that Teva filed in 
relation to COPAXONE.153 
B. MIRENA:  Filing Immediately Before Patent Expiration 
One example of the last-minute filings we discussed above154 appears 
in the case of MIRENA, a long-acting IUD.  Originally approved on 
December 6, 2000, the product can cost nearly $1000 and is the only 
hormonal release IUD in the U.S. market that provides birth control for 
up to five years, twice as long as other IUD products.155  MIRENA has 
carved out a market niche as a long-acting IUD. 
On December 4, 2015, Bayer HealthCare filed a citizen petition 
with the FDA.156  Of note, this petition was filed one day before the only 
patent protecting the drug was set to expire on December 5, 2015.157 
                                                 
cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Set_Current_Drug&ApplNo=090218
&DrugName=GLATOPA&ActiveIngred=GLATIRAMER%20ACETATE&SponsorApp
licant=SANDOZ%20INC&ProductMktStatus=1&goto=Search.DrugDetails (showing 
Sandoz-sponsored ANDA 090218, the only approved generic referencing 
COPAXONE, approved on April 16, 2015), with Teva Neuroscience, Inc. Citizen 
Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-1050-0001, at 2–4 (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1050-0001 (denied on April 
16, 2015). 
 152. See, e.g., PhRMA Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-5022-0001 (Dec. 22, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-5022-0001. 
 153. Another potential aspect of serial petitions occurs when a petitioner requests 
numerous actions.  For example, in 2015, Celgene petitioned the FDA to take 
particular action with regards to future ANDAs referencing ABRAXANE, as well as to 
set “stringent” standards for oncology therapies that use nanotechnology.  Celgene 
Corp. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-0732-0001 (Mar. 6, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-0732-0001.  This petition was 
80 pages in length and raises more issues than a mere request to impose additional 
bioequivalence testing.  As of August 3, 2016, the FDA had not issued a final 
determination on this petition—more than 500 days since Celgene filed the petition. 
 154. See supra Section IV.C. 
 155. Mirena, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/pro/mirena.html (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2016). 
 156. Bayer HealthCare LLC Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-4600-0001 (Dec. 4, 
2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-4600-0001. 
 157. Compare id., with LEVONORGESTREL (MIRENA) INTRAUTERINE DEVICE 
52MG, Orange Book:  Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, 
FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No= 
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As of the date of this Article, the FDA had yet to offer a substantive 
response to the concerns in the petition.  In fact, by November 2016, 
almost one year had passed since Bayer filed the petition without a 
clear grant or denial from the FDA.  This is more than double the time 
mandated pursuant to the FDAAA 150-day response period.158  Given 
that there is little public information on generics in the pipeline, the 
strategy behind the filing of the MIRENA petition is not clear.  But at 
a minimum, the fact that the petition was filed one day before 
expiration of the only patent protecting the drug strongly suggests 
that the company was interested in extending its exclusivity and 
ensuring that generics would be blocked from entering the market.159 
C. DORYX:  Combination of Citizen Petitions and Product Hopping 
Another concerning example is the use of citizen petitions 
together with product hopping.  Petitions are a strong supplemental 
means to cause uncertainty and delay for generic companies.  A 
recent product hopping case sheds light on this dynamic. 
Warner Chilcott160 engaged in a decade-long effort to avoid direct 
competition with generic powerhouse, Mylan.161  The product at 
issue, DORYX, is used to treat acne.  An immediate-release capsule 
version of the drug has been available since the 1960s.162 
                                                 
001&Appl_No=021225&Appl_type=N (listing U.S. Patent No. 5,785,053 and 
expiration date of Dec. 5, 2015) (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 158. While the FDA is required under the FDAAA to respond within 150 days 
unless delay would be necessary to protect the public health, there do not seem to be 
any mechanisms by which this timeframe can be enforced.  The FDA’s failure to 
meet the 150-day period undermines Congress’s intent. 
 159. The suspicious timing of Bayer’s petition regarding MIRENA is not unique.  
For a few other examples, see Cadence Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. 
FDA-2013-P-1508-0001 (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=F 
DA-2013-P-1508-0001. (OFIRMEV, petition filed within 2 days of data exclusivity 
expiration); Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2012-P-0943-
0001 (Aug. 29, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-P-0943-
0001 (LUNESTA, petition filed within 1 day of nearest Orange Book-listed patent 
expiration); AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-0823-
0001 (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0823-
0001 (CRESTOR, petition filed within 8 days of nearest data exclusivity expiration). 
 160. Warner Chilcott marketed DORYX in the United States along with Mayne 
Pharmaceuticals.  We refer solely to Warner Chilcott, which has been acquired by Actavis. 
 161. For a complete recitation of the facts regarding the DORYX product hopping 
case, see Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 
1736957, at *1–5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), aff’d, No. 15-2236, 2016 WL 5403626 (3d 
Cir. Sept. 28, 2016). 
 162. Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *2. 
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In the late 1990s, Warner Chilcott began developing a delayed-
release tablet version of DORYX and received NDA approval in May 
2005 for 75-mg and 100-mg unscored163 tablets.164  One year later, 
Mylan began developing generic 75-mg and 100-mg unscored 
tablets.165  Over the next seven years, Warner obtained various FDA 
approvals for tablets ranging from 75 mg to 150 mg, including such 
doses in single- and dual-scored tablet form.166  Each time Warner 
Chilcott received a new approval status for a different dosage and 
scored version of the tablet, Mylan sought to develop a generic.167 
In January 2009, Warner Chilcott began to aggressively market a 
150-mg, single-scored DORYX tablet.168  Within a few months, this 
version of the tablet represented 71% of new DORYX prescriptions.169  
One year later, 90% of patients had been switched to this version.170  
In the meantime, beginning in March 2010, Warner Chilcott began 
to develop a 150-mg, dual-scored version of the tablet.171  In June 
2011, the FDA granted tentative approval for Mylan’s generic 150-mg, 
single-scored version.172  Mylan had filed this ANDA almost three 
years earlier, in December 2008.173  Four months later, in September 
2011, Warner Chilcott received FDA approval for its 150-mg, dual-
scored version and immediately began to market that version.174 
                                                 
 163. “Unscored” means that there is no notch in the tablet to make it easier for a 
patient to split the tablet.  CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, TABLET 
SCORING:  NOMENCLATURE, LABELING, AND DATA FOR EVALUATION 1 n.2 (2013) 
(defining a score as “a debossed line that runs across the planar surface of the tablet” 
to facilitate tablet splitting).  For example, if a patient is prescribed two daily doses of 
50 mg, then the patient can split a single-scored 100-mg tablet. 
 164. Mylan Pharm., 2016 WL 5403626, at *3. 
 165. See id. at *4. 
 166. Id. at *3–4. 
 167. Mylan’s ability to rapidly develop new generic versions was important to its 
product line given Warner Chilcott’s lifecycle management strategies.  For example, 
Warner Chilcott announced that, as of May 2010, 90% of the DORYX market had 
been transferred to 150-mg, single-scored tablets.  See Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 
1736957, at *3.  This is important because the FDA would approve 75-mg and 100-mg 
unscored generic tablets in late 2010.  In other words, whenever a generic version of 
DORYX was ready for entry, Warner Chilcott was able to avoid direct competition by 
modifying its prior tablet version and obtaining approval before the generic entered. 
 168. See Mylan Pharm., 2015 WL 1736957, at *3. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. at *4. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 15-2236, 2016 WL 
5403626 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016), at *4. 
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This is where the citizen petition comes in.  After Mylan received 
tentative approval for a generic, single-scored version of DORYX in 
June 2011, a 505(q) citizen petition soon followed.175  Filed on 
September 23, 2011—before Mylan ever entered the market—
Warner Chilcott’s citizen petition urged the FDA to refrain from 
granting any ANDA referencing its 150-mg DORYX tablet unless the 
proposed generic was a dual-scored version.176  Warner Chilcott 
argued that patients would be confused if both single- and dual-
scored 150 mg tablets were available.177 
The FDA denied this petition 138 days later on February 8, 2012.178  
On that same day, the FDA gave final approval to Mylan’s ANDA for a 
150-mg, single-scored tablet and granted it an AB-rating for Warner 
Chilcott’s dual-scored version.179  Mylan launched its generic 150-mg, 
single-scored version immediately thereafter.180  This chronology 
strongly suggests that market entry of a single-scored, 150-mg generic 
was delayed approximately 138 days and was dependent on the FDA’s 
resolution of Warner Chilcott’s citizen petition. 
The DORYX saga presents a vivid case of how a citizen petition can 
be used to supplement other lifecycle management strategies, 
including product hopping.  Although Warner Chilcott avoided 
direct generic competition by changing dosage forms and tablet 
scoring, the use of the citizen petition was able to delay generic entry 
for more than four months. 
                                                 
 175. Warner Chilcott, LLC Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2011-P-0702-0001 (Sept. 23, 
2011), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0702-0001. 
 176. Id. at 1. 
 177. Id. at 5 n.24. 
 178. Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, to Izumi Hara, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Warner Chilcott 
(US), LLC (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/~/media/supportin 
g%20documents/The%20Pink%20Sheet/FDA%20letter%20denying%20Warner%2
0Chilcotts%20citizen%20petition.pdf. 
 179. Mylan Receives Final FDA Approval for First Generic Version of Doryx Tablets, 150 
mg, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 9, 2012, 8:20 AM) [hereinafter Mylan Final Approval], 
http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/mylan-receives-final-fda-approval-for-first-
generic-version-of-doryx%C2%AE-tablets-150-mg; see Carrier, supra note 33, at 1018 
(indicating that an AB rating allows pharmacists to substitute generic versions of 
brand drugs). 
 180. Mylan Final Approval, supra note 179. 
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D. EpiPen:  Citizen Petitions, Settlements, and Price Hikes 
Mylan’s billion-dollar EpiPen presents the final example of dubious 
uses of citizen petitions.181  Initially approved in 1987, EpiPen auto-
injectors are the primary means of treating severe allergic 
reactions.182  Mylan received significant unwanted attention in 2016 
for its price hike of the EpiPen,183 but its citizen petition largely 
escaped notice.  The lifecycle of the EpiPen reveals how Mylan used 
citizen petitions along with settlements to delay generic entry. 
The saga began with Teva filing an ANDA seeking approval to 
market a generic EpiPen.  Mylan commenced litigation against Teva,184 
and the parties settled in April 2012.185  Under the terms of the 
settlement, Teva agreed to delay the launch of its generic epinephrine 
auto-injector for more than three years, until June 2015.186 
But as Teva’s entry loomed, Mylan reached into its toolkit to pull 
out a citizen petition, which it filed on January 16, 2015, a mere six 
months before Teva was scheduled (pursuant to the settlement) to 
enter the market.187  In its petition, Mylan contended that Teva 
should be required to demonstrate that its product was the “same as” 
                                                 
 181. Mylan Sales and Revenue up While EpiPen Becomes Its First $1 Billion-Selling 
Product, PHARMA LETTER (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.thepharmaletter.com/article/ 
mylan-sales-and-revenue-up-while-epipen-becomes-its-first-1-billion-selling-product. 
 182. EpiPen, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/pro/epipen.html (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2016). 
 183. See, e.g., Olga Khazan, Have You Ever Tried to Buy an EpiPen?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 
24, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/08/epi-pens/497126/; 
Andrew Pollack, Mylan Raised EpiPen’s Price Before the Expected Arrival of a Generic, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/business/mylan-
raised-epipens-price-before-the-expected-arrival-of-a-generic.html?_r=0. 
 184. Complaint, King Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., (D. Del. Aug. 
28, 2009) (No. 09-CV-00652). 
 185. See Pollack, supra note 183. 
 186. See Press Release, Mylan, Mylan and Pfizer Announce Epinephrine Auto-
Injector Settlement Agreement with Teva (Apr. 26, 2012), http://newsroom.mylan. 
com/press-releases?item=123144; see also Phil Milford, Mylan, Pfizer Reach Epinephrine-
Pen Settlement with Teva, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2012-04-26/mylan-pfizer-announce-epinephrine-pen-settlement-
with-teva-1- (suggesting that Teva might experience a longer-than-expected delay 
because it would need the FDA to approve its generic before it could enter the 
epinephrine-pen market). 
 187. Mylan Specialty LP Citizen Petition, No. FDA-2015-P-0181-0001 (Jan. 16, 
2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-0181-0001.  Mylan 
may have known about Teva’s ANDA as early as 2008.  See Michael A. Carrier & Carl 
J. Minniti, The Untold EpiPen Story:  How Mylan Hiked Prices by Blocking Rivals, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841445. 
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Mylan’s EpiPen.188  In other words, even though the parties had 
already agreed through settlement to delay Teva’s generic entry for 
more than three years, Mylan sought to further delay the entry of 
Teva’s generic through its citizen petition. 
In addition to its January 2015 petition, the company waited almost 
five months after filing and only weeks before the FDA was required to 
respond, until May 2015, to supplement its petition with a 48-page 
independent study purportedly showing that patients would not use 
Teva’s generic correctly.189 
Given that Teva’s generic had been in development for at least six 
years before the petition’s filing,190 this late-filing of a supplemental 
study implicates significant timing questions.  Why would such a study 
be submitted only weeks before the FDA was required to respond 
under the FDAAA’s 150-day clock?191 
Even though Teva’s ANDA ultimately was denied in the spring of 
2016,192 the petition still raises concern since Mylan (1) could not 
have known at the time of filing that the FDA would deny the 
application and (2) increased the likelihood of delay through its 
stalled petition and supplemental filing. 
CONCLUSION 
Citizen petitions have received far less attention than other conduct 
in the pharmaceutical industry. But they can play a crucial role in 
delaying generic entry.  Brand firms file 92% of 505(q) citizen 
petitions, with the FDA denying more than 9 out of every 10 petitions. 
We posited some reasons for the high denial rate, focusing on the 
increasing length of petitions, close proximity between petitions and 
expiration of a patent or FDA exclusivity, and incidence of the FDA 
                                                 
 188. Id. 
 189. Supplement from Mylan Generic Epinephrine Auto-Injector Handling Study, 
No. FDA-2015-P-0181-0008, at 45 (May 28, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/docu 
ment?D=FDA-2015-P-0181-0008. 
 190. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 187, at 9–10. 
 191. The study also apparently “had a lot of problems” as it “lacked a control 
group; did not study the actual generic but a prototype instead; used a small number 
of participants; failed to provide them with proper instructions for use; and told 
participants to watch a video rather than actually use the Teva device.”  Ed Silverman, 
How Mylan Tried to Keep Teva from Selling a Generic EpiPen, STAT (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/08/31/mylan-teva-generic-epipen/. 
 192. Carly Helfand, FDA Swats down Teva’s EpiPen Copy, Putting Mylan in Cruise 
Control, FIERCEPHARMA (Mar. 1, 2016, 10:39 AM), http://www.fiercepharma.com/ 
sales-and-marketing/fda-swats-down-teva-s-epipen-copy-putting-mylan-cruise-control. 
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granting generic approval simultaneously with its resolution of petitions.  
These settings result in grants of only 3%, 2%, and 0%, respectively. 
In short, and in defiance of Congress’s attempt to limit abuse, 
citizen petitions continue to play an increasingly important role in 
delaying generic competition. 
 
